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Abstract In some organizational applications, the principle of allocation (PoA) and
scale advantage (SA) oppose each other. While PoA implies that organizations with
wide niches get punished, SA holds that large organizations gain an advantage be-
cause of scale efficiencies. The opposition occurs because many large organizations
also possess wide niches. However, analyzing these theoretical mechanisms implies a
possible trade-off between niche width and size: if both PoA and SA are strong, then
organizations must be either focused or large to survive, resulting in a dual market
structure, as proposed by the theory of resource partitioning. This article develops a
computational model used to study this trade-off, and investigates the properties of
organizational populations with low/high SA and low/high PoA. The model gener-
ates three expected core “corner” solutions: (1) the dominance of large organizations
in the strong SA setting; (2) the proliferation of narrow-niche organizations in the
strong PoA setting; and (3) a bifurcated or dual market structure if both SA and PoA
are present. The model also allows us to identify circumstances under which narrow-
niche (specialists) or wide-niche (generalists) organizations thrive. We also use the
model to examine the claim that concentrated resource distributions are more likely to
generate partitioned or bifurcated populations. We also investigate the consequences
of environments comprised of ordered versus unordered positions.
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1 Introduction
Organizational ecology’s niche theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977) builds on the
premise that a specialist (narrow-niche) organization designed well for a particular
environmental state will outperform a generalist (broad-niche) organization in that
same state. In order to perform adequately in other environmental states, the gener-
alist organization must carry extra capacity, appearing as slack at any point. In other
words, the specialist “maximizes its exploitation of the environment and accepts the
risk of having that environment change” while the generalist “accepts a lower level
of exploitation in return for greater security” (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 948). The
theory thus imposes the constant-sum constraint holding that increased breadth of
a niche comes at the expense of lowered appeal at some positions (Péli 1997; Hsu
2006). This assumption has come to be known as the principle of allocation (PoA).
Resource partitioning theory (Carroll 1985) presents an alternative theory of niche
width based on different assumptions. This theory holds that generalists might actu-
ally benefit from participating in multiple activities if they can achieve larger scale.
These scale advantages (SA) might be strong enough to outweigh any overhead costs
of having a broad niche, thus giving the overall advantage to generalist organizations.
Hannan et al. (2007) propose a unified theory that attempts to resolve the tension
between the two original theories. The unified theory uses several additional con-
ceptual ideas, including audiences and engagement. It also provides explicit ways to
model both the principle of allocation (PoA) and scale advantage (SA). In this article,
we use the unified theory to develop a computational model to study these processes,
making additional assumptions as needed to generate a simulation platform. Elements
of the resulting model and findings transcend interest in organizational ecology. For
instance, processes of scale advantage pertain to a broad class of economic and soci-
ological phenomena, including scale economies in production and distribution, net-
work externalities, attention allocation, and the efficacy of governmental lobbying.
In exploring the model, we address the key theoretical question: How does the
tradeoff between niche width and scale work? The principle of allocation (PoA) says
that the broader an organization’s niche, the lower its appeal and effectiveness. Scale
advantage (SA) suggests that breadth is sometimes also associated with beneficial
effects because it may raise size capacity higher than with a narrow niche. Moreover,
a broad niche often provides a guard against an uncertain future but the broader an
organization’s niche, the more likely it is to encounter competitors.
For most social scientists, the best answer to the above question would come from
observing and comparing how organizational populations develop across time in con-
texts where PoA and SA processes operate at varying levels of intensity. Unfortu-
nately, collecting detailed data on a single organizational population over its history
proves to be a major undertaking, let alone multiple comparable populations. More
importantly, for any real historical population, we can at best only infer indirectly
the strength of unobservable processes of PoA and SA. And, the data one would use
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to make such inferences are likely to include outcomes of interest, meaning that the
analysis could be conflated.
Because of the difficulty in testing the tradeoff empirically, we use here compu-
tational methods. Within a modeling framework, computational methods allow us to
set precisely the strength of processes of PoA and SA (as well as other parameters)
and to explore their implications for population developments including structure.
In Harrison et al.’s (2007) view, computational methods prove especially valuable
in examining the outcomes of multiple, interdependent processes such as those we
investigate here.
To be more precise, we use the model to tell us how the distributions of niche width
and size vary across populations with different levels of processes of PoA and SA.
In other words, we assume specific PoA and SA functions and parameter settings as
given characteristics of a population and its audience. Using Monte Carlo simulation
techniques, we then generate, observe and compare populations with all kinds of
combinations (including rare ones) of the processes including low PoA-low SA; low
PoA-high SA; high PoA-low SA; high PoA-high SA and others. Such comparisons
would be onerous (at best) with real-world observational data, but the simulation
model yields analytical insight, much as laboratory experiments do when they isolate
hard-to-discern processes. Moreover, because of the precision required to build the
simulation, the model-building effort forces us to go beyond Hannan et al.’s (2007)
specification and to render a more detailed version of the theory and related processes.
The theory we use contains several different components, each the subject of con-
siderable attention. To keep our presentation from becoming overly complicated, we
proceed in steps. First, rather than present the entire theory underlying the model, we
describe each of the various components of the theory (audience, principle of allo-
cation, scale advantage) and our associated modeling efforts—operationalizations—
in turn, while providing some additional information about the credibility of each.
Next, we demonstrate the general validity of the model by showing that it gener-
ates outcomes expected by theory and by previous empirical research.1 Following
that, we turn to questions about organizational action and environmental resource
distributions. For organizational action, we aim to identify circumstances that favor
narrow-niche organization (specialism), or wide-niche organization (generalism). For
environments, we explore the speculation that concentrated resource distributions are
more likely to generate partitioned or bifurcated populations.
2 The audience as niche
2.1 The niche
The first step in developing the computational model involves defining and conceptu-
alizing the organizational niche. Organizational niches can be defined for a vast array
1In some contexts, analysts do not have much empirical or theoretical knowledge by which to assess the
credibility of their model. Fortunately, in the case of niche width and scale, we have ample background
research from organizational ecology and elsewhere to use in establishing validity.
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of environmental properties, including the tastes of potential consumers and mem-
bers, the availability of various kinds of input (e.g., human and financial capital), and
legal and regulatory regimes. We follow most contemporary research and focus on
consumers in markets for products and services.
In doing so, we build on and adapt the framework of Hannan et al. (2007) in
envisioning four interrelated components of the niche: the audience, the resource
space, engagement and actual appeal. We discuss the basic theoretical issues in turn,
and describe our computational operationalization of each at the same time.
2.2 Audience and position
Hannan et al. (2007: 33) define an audience segment as “a differentiated set of all
those agents with an intense interest in the organizations [in a domain], their activities
and their products.” Here we restrict the relevant audience to those in the domain-
wide audience with an interest in consuming the products or other offerings of the set
of producers being considered.
To link the model with prior research on organizational niches, we conceptual-
ize the audience as distributed over a social or socio-demographic space (McPherson
2004). Tastes of the audience members are assumed to be a function of position in this
space. For simplicity, we initially conceptualize the environment as composed of au-
dience members located in unordered categories of social distinctions reflecting their
tastes. We use the term social position to refer to an audience category in this space.
We assume that the category has social standing and that it is recognized and used by
audience members. Later in the analysis below, we incorporate distance into the so-
cial space; this complication allows us to investigate to what extent the ordering of re-
source positions or categories affects the outcome of resource partitioning processes.
We consider only prototypical tastes (for particular products or services) at each
social position, which represent the modal tastes of the audience. For instance, Grif-
fin (2006) reports survey results showing that in 1993 the music genre African-
Americans most liked to listen to was “Gospel,” while for Southern whites it was
“Country” and for non-Southern whites it was “Rock.” (Of course, some persons of
each ethnic group do not subscribe to the typical taste but a plurality do.)
2.3 Resource space
In our model, the environment within which organizations operate is a resource space
filled only with audience members with prototypical tastes. The audience members
are demarcated by position along one dimension. But various positions in the space
might have more or less strong prototypical tastes for the organization’s products or
services. And, the various positions might be populated by many or few audience
members (potential consumers). Obviously, the potential maximum demand, or re-
sources available to organizations at a position reflects a combination of both the
taste at that position and the size of the audience there.
Rather than delve into the underlying factors separately, for simplicity we summa-
rize the joint operation of taste and audience size at positions by an exogenously de-
termined resource space. The resources available for organizations vary by position.
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Locations with many market or environmental resources might reflect strong taste for
the product, many audience members or both. For instance, day care services for hu-
mans tend to find many more audience members with relevant tastes among (families
with) young children and the elderly.
2.3.1 Operationalization of the resource space
In our modeling setup, the environment or market of an organization consists solely
of the audience. We model the environment by generating an exogenous two-
dimensional space representing: (1) the social positions (x) of the audience (the posi-
tions are unordered), and (2) the potential maximum demand or resources [R(x)] of
the audience at each position, reflecting the strength of the prototypical taste and the
size of the audience at x.
Imagine that the number of positions in an environment is fixed, at say 10. For the
initial analysis, we use a simple setup for the positions: we regard positions as un-
ordered categorical distinctions (this assumption is later relaxed). Because there is no
meaningful ordering among the positions, we cannot measure the distance between
any two positions; likewise, there are no neighboring positions and distant positions.
For example, in the ethnic categories given above for taste in musical genre, African-
Americans are no closer to Southern whites than to non-Southern whites.
Potential maximum demand represents the total amount of resource that can be
obtained from a position by all organizations. In the simulation, the potential maxi-
mum demand in each position is set in the beginning and remains fixed throughout
the simulation run. So, the environment might be envisioned as a histogram of de-
mand across the 10 positions, or as a distribution of resources across the positions.
Figure 1 provides a visualization of one possible resource distribution; any ordering
of the positions a–j would be equivalent in our initial simulations.
2.4 Organizations
In this analysis, we model the evolution of a (fixed) constant set of organizations in
the resource space. Over time, individual organizations can grow extremely large or
shrink to infinitesimal size; they can remain narrow niche players throughout their
Fig. 1 Illustrative resource
distribution
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lives or expand to a breadth equal to the width of the resource space. We exam-
ine mean levels of organizational size and niche width as well as properties of the
population distribution such as bifurcation, in both the steady state equilibrium and
evolutionary trajectories.
Those readers familiar with research on resource partitioning may be surprised by
the exclusion entry and exit processes from the simulations because they are the ob-
jects of much empirical work. However, we believe that the trade-off between PoA
and SA should hold even if entry and exit processes are not present, and we be-
lieve that resource partitioning theory contains nothing to suggest otherwise. So, we
contend that the joint operation of PoA and SA trade-off can produce bifurcation in
organizational size and niche width distributions of on-going populations. We believe
that if demonstrated, this novel implication on the theory would only strengthen the
fundamental insights of resource partitioning.
There are also technical considerations. Since PoA and SA are organizational
processes that operate in existing organizational populations rather than on entre-
preneurs, we think that the additional assumptions required to incorporate entry
processes would obfuscate understanding at this stage of model development (the
model is already complex, as will be seen below). By contrast, organizational exit
is implicitly modeled in the cases of organizations that shrink to a very small size.
As Hannan et al. (2007: 220–223) demonstrate in Theorems 10.1–10.4, the essential
insights of resource partitioning can be modeled even without entry processes.
2.5 Engagement
Within a market or environment, Hannan et al. (2007) argue that the conversion of
prototypical taste into actual appeal depends on actions taken by an organization
with respect to its product or service offerings—engagement of the market. They
define engagement as the attention that producers pay to different subgroups in the
audience. In their theory, a durable pattern of engagement converts prototypical tastes
into actual appeal.
Engagement refers to a diverse set of activities undertaken by organizations and
their agents, including: (1) learning about the idiosyncrasies of the local audience
position and its aesthetics; (2) designing or redesigning features of the offering to
make it attractive to that part of the audience; and (3) trying to establish a favorable
identity in the relevant location(s). In many cases of interest, key engagement activ-
ities include developing and displaying credible signals of authenticity (Carroll and
Swaminathan 2000; Baron 2004).
2.5.1 Operationalization of engagement
In the computational model, we assign each organization an engagement budget that
reflects how much effort it expends in trying to win resources at positions in the
environment. We let the engagement budget E of organization a at time t for position
x be noted by E(t, a, x).
In simulations reported below, we start each organization at only a single position,
from which it can expand according to predetermined rules described below. In later
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Fig. 2 Illustrative engagement
budgets of a specialist and a
generalist
steps, as described below, engagement budgets increase for larger organizations as a
result of scale advantage. Initially, every organization starts out with a budget of the
same size and it is allocated fully to the position the organization occupies.
Figure 2 gives an example of the engagement budgets of two organizations. In the
first, engagement spans a relatively narrow part of the resource space, while in the
second, engagement is spread more broadly.
Note that in this operationalization, positioning as a generalist or a specialist repre-
sents an organizational choice, rather than the structure of the demand. While debat-
able, it seems to us (and many other organizational theorists) that many entrepreneurs
and organizations adopt and attempt to succeed with market postures that in the end
wind up being infeasible (Carroll 1993). In this sense, we believe that choices about
niche width are more-or-less often “supply” driven. Of course, both views bear some
validity but in our model demand mainly affects market viability.
2.6 Actual appeal
For modeling clarity, we assume that the intrinsic appeal of an offering is constant
across all environmental positions and focus on its actual appeal.2 With intrinsic ap-
peal held constant, the actual appeal of an offering to the audience members at a
social position depends both on the total resources available at a position and on
the intensity of the organization’s engagement at that social position (Hannan et al.
2This assumption enables us to understand more clearly how the model operates: allowing intrinsic appeal
to also vary would add another level of exogenously imposed complexity. We hope to add this complication
in later efforts, once we understand the simpler model. For now, we justify it in part by claiming that the
setup we use does likely resemble contexts where firms face multiple (but similar) geographic markets.
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Fig. 3 Illustrative values of
actual appeal
2007). Without competition, organizations can expect to get more resources from en-
gaged locations with abundant resources. Not engaging a position is essentially like
not being present at the location; a firm can only obtain resources at those positions
where it spends part of its engagement budget.
For example, although sports drinks such as Gatorade might have had latent at-
traction to athletic-minded individuals for much of the late twentieth century in the
United States, it was not until Stokeley-Van Camp Inc. introduced and marketed (i.e.,
engaged the market with) Gatorade in 1969 that actual appeal became positive. Re-
cruitment strategies by firms, universities, political parties, and other kinds of orga-
nizations also represent efforts to engage potential audiences in the market for mem-
bers.
What happens if more than one organization engages at a given position? Such
overlap in engagement reflects competition at the location. We determine the out-
come of competition in a straight-forward way: organizations win competition at a
given position proportional to their engagement relative to that of all other organi-
zation. That is, competitive outcomes are determined by proportional investments in
engagement.
2.6.1 Operationalization of actual appeal
We operationalize the actual appeal of an organization’s offering as the product
of the resource level of a location and the organization’s proportion of total en-
gagement (of all organizations) at the location. When there is overlap or compe-
tition, an organization’s share of appeal is given by the proportional engagement:
E(t, a, x)/
∑
a E(t, a, x). So, actual appeal is this share applied to the resource level
of a location, or in formal terms: R(t, a, x)[E(t, a, x)]/∑a E(t, x). Figure 3 illus-
trates how actual appeal works in the modeling framework; it shows the actual appeal
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of the two organizations represented in Fig. 2 by engagement when operating in the
resource space of Fig. 1. Obviously, one organization (the leftmost part of the figure)
appears as a specialist located in an abundant part of the space and the other as a
generalist in sparser parts of the environment. Because they both engage at positions
e and h and because resources are available there, they each show actual appeal at
those positions, proportional to their engagements. The generalist also shows actual
appeal at positions c, g and i.
Note that this formalization of competition and splitting of appeal at a given posi-
tion has a specific property: if an organization is the only producer in a given position,
then it will get all the appeal, no matter what size engagement budget it allocates to
that position. This property of the model is realistic some situations, but less realistic
in others. For the former, just think of a gas station that is the only place in a given
isolated town—the model assumes that this gas station will obtain (nearly) all the
demand for gas in that town even if it neglects its customers relative to activities of
stations in other towns.3 All in all, we make this assumption for two reasons: First,
the model does not assume that the total market’s demand will be fulfilled as well—
that process is influenced by the capacity (in the model organizations fulfill demand
only up to their capacity). Second, in most of our experimental designs of 10 niche
positions and 40 organizations, lone niche occupants will be rare, and resources will
be almost always contested.
3 The principle of allocation (PoA)
The PoA holds that a “constant-sum” constraint limits niche width in organizations.
That is, increased niche width comes at the expense of lowered engagement at some
positions (Péli 1997; Hsu 2006). The simplest version of this principle operates like
a fixed budget—once some part of it is expended at some location, then not as much
is available for deployment at other locations. In the model we use here, this simple
version of PoA operates automatically through engagement, where each organization
receives a fixed budget initially. Through the engagement process, an organization
that locates solely at a single position and uses its full budget there will be able (in a
resource-tight context) to out-compete an organization with a wider but overlapping
niche (say 2–3 positions). This occurs because the wider niche organization must
spend some of its engagement budget at the other positions and the result of the
competition is determined by relative engagement expenditures.
Recent theory and research on PoA in identity-based setting suggest a different,
even stronger process (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Baron 2004; Hsu 2006). It
shows that organizations which span wide parts of the resource space not only suffer
3An anonymous reviewer called our attention to a different example: a situation where someone opens
the first restaurant in a small town where people are unaccustomed to dining out (e.g., a rural Russian
town in early 1990). In this case, we would still maintain the restaurant would (like the gas station above)
get nearly all the demand in the town and could ignore restaurants in other towns. What seems different
here is that we would expect that total demand in the town would grow after the first restaurant. That is,
aggregate demand may be stimulated by supply. At this stage, we do not incorporate this complication into
the model, but it could be done readily in an extension.
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from thinly spread budgets but from disproportionately weaker identities, as well as
audience penalties in some cases. In other words, some audiences may disfavor wide-
niche organizations in principle (typically for moral or signaling reasons) or there
may be non-linear positive returns to engagement at some positions. For example,
Microsoft may enter the gaming market but it will not develop much of an identity as
a gaming company due to its many other activities. So, engagements based on a wide
niche may be penalized above and beyond the fixed budget constraint. Whereas the
budget limitation makes it hard to span broad resource spaces in the fact of compe-
tition, a penalized engagement in such a situation makes it even harder. In economic
terms, the penalized engagement amounts to a scope disadvantage.
In the analysis we conduct here, what we call the PoA is modeled with this
identity-based process in mind. In setting PoA conditions, we let the market or au-
dience penalize broad niche organizations by discounting the engagements of the
organization in positions that are not the organizations’ focus. A strong PoA in our
setup means a bigger discount factor for the engagement. It is important to recognize
that our low-PoA condition still contains the fixed budget constraint on engagement
that is sometimes called PoA.
3.1 Operationalization of the principle of allocation
In the analysis we conduct here, PoA is modeled by reducing an organization’s en-
gagement when its niche width spans many social positions. In other words, in setting
PoA we let the market or audience penalize broad niche organizations by shrinking
their engagement budgets.
More specifically, in each period t for each organization a at each resource posi-
tion x, we force engagement to be reduced with the inverse proportion of the engage-
ment at that position of the organization and the total engagement of the organization.






rameter A regulates the strength of the PoA penalty. Positive values of A lead to a
scope disadvantage, a key implication of the PoA. If A = 0, then there is no penalty,
and higher values of A reflect stronger PoA processes. Reduced engagement feeds
back to the model of competition, inasmuch as the resources in each resource position
are distributed to the organizations proportional to their now-reduced engagements.
4 Scale advantage
A scale advantage exists when the returns to some activity increase disproportionately
with the scale at which it is conducted. The most familiar case comes from an activity
that incurs both a fixed cost, independent of the number of items produced, and a
variable (per-item) cost. The marginal cost of producing an item in this case declines
with scale, as the ratio of fixed to variable costs declines. Organizations generally
use scale advantages to improve the price/quality of offerings relative to those of
competitors.
Here we follow Hannan et al. (2007) in translating the scale advantage idea to
mean that growth in scale gets converted into greater engagement—a rise in scale
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inflates an organization’s appeal distribution by increasing its expected level of total
engagement. Note that scale advantage conceptualized this way overrides the part of
the principle of allocation that holds that the expected level of total engagement does
not vary among the producers in a market.
4.1 Operationalization of scale advantage
We set S(t) as the mean size of all organizations a at time t . Then if S(t, a) > S(t),





, where Q is simply a scaling factor;
there is no scale advantage if S(t, a) < S(t).
In this operationalization, scale advantage is relative. While we could have mod-
eled SA as an absolute measure, such as a direct function of organizational size, we
chose not to do this because the competitive advantage offered by scale is not ab-
solute but relative to competitors. In the most common interpretation, scale provides
cost advantages and these matter if another firm is larger or smaller, and to what
degree. The operationalization also assumes for modeling simplicity that scale ad-
vantage never reaches any limit: larger organizations always possess advantage over
smaller ones. Of course, in some real contexts, the advantages of very large scale are
thought to taper off as complexity and inertia impede coordination.
5 Building the model of organizational evolution
To examine how SA and PoA affect the distribution of organizational sizes and niche
widths, we constructed a more complete model of organizational evolution. The min-
imal additional components for such a model include capacity, size, and niche expan-
sion.
5.1 Capacity
Every organization possesses a production capacity at any given point in time. The
capacity represents the total amount of goods or service that it is able to produce
according to the existing facilities, labor, capital etc. The capacity C of organization
a at time t is given by C(t, a) variable, which evolves initially as a Gibrat process,
determined exogenously by random draws (Sutton 1997). Increments in capacity are
determined in part by the relationship between capacity and the amount of resources
the organization could obtain after competition. If the capacity is smaller than the pos-
sible share the organization could obtain, then capacity grows according to a Gibrat
with a high-growth parameter. If capacity already exceeds demand, then capacity
changes according to a Gibrat of lower expected value. Formally, the algorithm is:
C(t + 1, a, x) = C(t, a, x) · exp(0.1 + RNormal · 0.15)
if C(t, a, x) <
∑
[E(t, a, x)/E∗]R(x) and
C(t + 1, a, x) = C(t, a, x) · exp(0.02 + RNormal · 0.15) otherwise
where RNormal is a random normal deviate.
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5.2 Organizational size
In this analysis, we consider organizational size as the main outcome of interest. As
we have set up the model, size reflects the outcome of processes of resource ac-
quisition and competition. Organizations take resources from their positions in the
environment based on (1) whether they have the capacity to serve the positions and
(2) whether they can out-compete other organizations attempting to draw resources
at the same positions. The outcome is the size of the organization, as represented by
its total goods or services sold. Size must always be less than or equal to an organiza-
tion’s capacity. Unused capacity plays no active role in triggering competition in the
model, as it sometimes does in real industrial contexts.
At every social position x, there will be a competition for resources R(x) if several
organizations are located there and have available capacity. If enough resources are
available at position x [that is, if R(x) is large enough] for all organizations seeking
resources to fill capacity, then each takes what it needs. That is, if R(x) is greater than
all C(t, a, x) summed over x, then all a organizations achieve the size determined by
their capacities.
Let organizational size be construed as capacity realized in the environment, in
the sense of the number of resource units the organization is able to take from the
environment. Let it be the case that size at time t for organization a at position x is
given by S(t, a, x). The upper bound on S(t, a, x) is given by capacity C(t, a, x).
If R(x) is less than all C(t, a, x) summed over x, then organizations are involved
in a competition for scarce resources at position x. The outcome of the competition
depends on the relative efforts spent by the organizations located at that position,
which is given by their engagements E(t, a, x). Let the sum of these E(t, a, x) values
at t over all the organizations present at x be noted by E∗. Then the outcome of the
competition is given by [E(t, a, x)/E∗]R(x) so long as it remains below C(t, a, x)
and C(t, a, x) otherwise. That is, the size of organization a at x is given by
S(t, a, x) = [E(t, a, x)/E∗]R(x) if C(t, a, x) >
∑
[E(t, a, x)/E∗]R(x) and
S(t, a, x) = C(t, a, x) otherwise.
5.3 Engagement allocation and niche expansion
As explained above, at the end of each time period every organization is assigned a
new engagement budget (which is a function of its size in the previous period). The
increment to an organization’s engagement budget is allocated either to its existing
positions or to a new environmental position taken by the organization. If applied to
existing positions, then the engagement budget is allocated across all existing posi-
tions, proportionally to the engagement levels at the previous period at the positions.
So, for instance, if the increment is 0.2 and the organization operates equally in two
positions, then each position’s engagement is 0.1. Note that in this case the relative
distribution of the engagement budget of an organization does not shift.
An organization that gets an increment to its engagement budget might use it to
expand its niche width. We model such expansion as a random occurrence. Let NExp
be the probability of a niche expansion. Then any organization with an increment to
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Fig. 4 Overview of the computational model
its engagement budget experiences the risk NExp of expanding. The location of the
expansion is also random, with an equal chance that it occurs at any of the organiza-
tion’s currently unoccupied positions.
Of course, this simple operationalization of engagement allocation and niche ex-
pansion can be elaborated in subsequent research. For example, engagement alloca-
tion in this model does not depend on the (possible) gains of allocating engagements
to a given niche. However, as our main focus in this model is not on the organizational
level but on the population level, we decided to keep the modeling of organizational
action simple. A similar rationale applies to our implicit assumption that organiza-
tions might grow indefinitely.
5.4 Model overview
Figure 4 provides an overview of the operation of the simulation model. Initially, at
time 0 the environmental resource distribution is set. In the next time period, time 1,
the levels of engagement (E) and capacity (C) are assigned to each organization, as
explained above. The resulting competition with other organizations at each resource
position determines the organization’s size in that period. In the next period, time 2,
and all subsequent periods, engagement is recalculated based on prior size. So too
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is capacity, although its evolution is governed by the Gibrat mechanism. Finally, al-
though not shown, expanding organizations undergo some chance of niche expansion
in the subsequent time period.
5.5 Model evaluation
In assessing the model’s basic validity, we examine its ability to meet three gen-
eral expectations of previous theory and research: (1) Under a strong PoA process
and no SA, narrow-niche organizations should eventually dominate the population;
(2) Under a strong SA process and no PoA, large organizations should eventually
dominate the population; (3) Under the operation of both PoA and SA, a tradeoff
should sometimes be observable for long periods. By strong process, we mean one
where the parameter settings are set to levels that produce pronounced effects (we
also at points refer to PoA and SA parameters as low or high to reflect varying in-
tensity of effects). We acknowledge that the values for the parameters we used in the
models are stylized, and when we refer to them as low or high or strong, we mean
low or high in the parameter space explored in our models. As the model is stylized,
we do not want to (and cannot) establish direct relations to given empirical settings.
However, we believe that such a modeling exercise should be viewed as a “proof of
concept,” which explores new phenomena. For instance, a strong SA process should
allow some organizations to potentially overcome the PoA, thereby generating a dual
structure (consisting of either a plethora of wide and narrow niche structures or a
combination of large and small sized organizations) in a population. In scoring the
model’s performance on these conditions, we investigate evolution over time as well
as the equilibrium distributions.
6 Findings
We organize the findings of the simulations into three major parts. The first part
describes some basic results for the model, and discusses the tradeoff between SA
and PoA, including how these processes influence the emerging market structures.
In the second part, we conduct sensitivity analyses, and investigate under what cir-
cumstances the relationships hold. Specifically, we analyze the effect of the shape of
the resource distribution, and investigate how the effects of SA and PoA change over
time. Finally, we focus our analysis on the organizational level, and investigate the
optimal behavior of organizations under different SA and PoA setups.
6.1 Scale advantage and principle of allocation
According to our basic expectations for the model’s validity, we want to see (1) that
as the SA process gets stronger, a few large, generalist organizations begin to dom-
inate the population and (2) that as PoA gets stronger, small and focused organi-
zations should start to proliferate. Combining these two forces, we expect to see
that dual structures will emerge in markets where both SA and PoA operate with
force. To examine these expectations, we look at two different measures of market
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Fig. 5 Aggregate size of organizations by niche width, in four different SA/PoA settings
structure outcomes. First, we investigate the aggregate size of organizations by niche
width. This measure allows us to assess what proportion of total resources accrues to
narrow-niche and broad-niche organizations. Second, we look at the size distribution
of organizations, as measured by (1) concentration (measured with the Gini index)
and (2) polarization, measured using Wolfson’s (1994) p∗—see Appendix for a de-
scription). Polarization allows us to identify the emergence of dual market structures.
The various measures provide different perspectives on the niche width distributions
and size distributions of the simulated organizations.
Our simulation experiments varied the SA parameter Q from 0,1,2, . . . , to 8; the
PoA parameter A ranged from 0,0.2,0.4, . . . , to 2.0. For clarity in isolating effects of
SA and PoA, we kept all other parameters fixed. Specifically, we assumed 10 market
positions in the environment, each with a resource level of 10—this setup implies that
the resource space is uniformly distributed. The simulations started with 40 organi-
zations, all with an initial size of 1, an initial capacity of 1, and an initial engagement
budget of 1. Each organization started with a narrow niche, NW = 1, located in a ran-
domly chosen position. Each organization was assigned a certain probability that it
expanded its niche width if it grows in size—these probabilities were drawn randomly
from a 0–0.3 uniform random distribution. Each simulation run was 100 periods, and
each setup was iterated 500 times.
Figure 5 shows how the average aggregate size of organizations changes by niche
width under four different SA and PoA settings. Figure 5a provides the baseline case,
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Fig. 6 Aggregate size of organizations by niche width, by SA
in which neither SA nor PoA operates. Figure 5b shows that strong SA (and no PoA)
leads to the dominance of generalist organizations. Figure 5c illustrates that strong
PoA leads to more narrow-niche organizations, although the resulting distribution
does not differ radically from the baseline case, Fig. 5a.4 Figure 5d shows that in
setups with both strong SA and strong PoA, a dual market structure emerges: a larger
part of the resource space is taken up by either narrow or wide niche organizations.
These figures provide evidence supporting the validity of the model.
To check the robustness of the PoA and SA effects, we ran simulations with a
range of PoA and SA settings. Figure 6 provides one of these validity checks—it
shows how change in the SA parameter Q affects the average aggregate size of orga-
nizations by niche width (keeping the PoA parameter A constant, at 2). This figure
illustrates the trade-off between SA and PoA. When SA is weak and only PoA op-
erates, then the market is dominated by focused, narrow niche width organizations.
As SA gets stronger, dual market structures emerge. And, as SA gets very strong,
the dual market structure disappears, and the market becomes dominated by wide
niche generalists. This finding reveals a scope condition for resource partitioning: for
a bifurcated market structure to arise, SA cannot be too strong relative to PoA. In
other words, a polarized market only arises if the “right” combinations of PoA and
SA are present: both PoA and SA need to be operative, but neither of them can be too
dominant.
4The reason for this is the following: if there is no scale advantage, organizations do not really grow in
size (and therefore in engagement budget). Thus, there will be only small amounts of engagement in the
positions into which they expand, and therefore PoA does not really make much of a difference.
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Fig. 7 Average Gini score by SA and PoA
Our basic expectations for the model’s validity concern both niche width and size
distributions in different setups. An advantage of the computational model is that it
allows us to disentangle the effects of size (small or large) from niche width (narrow
specialist or wide generalist). So, we next investigate the effect of PoA and SA on
the size distribution of organizations in concentration (measured with the Gini coef-
ficient), and polarization (measured with Wolfson’s (1994) polarization measure; see
Appendix for a short description of this measure).
First we analyze the steady-state values of concentration and polarization. We cal-
culated the Gini and Wolfson’s p∗ measures after 100 periods (the process always
reached the steady state within 100 periods).
Figure 7 shows how the average Gini coefficient of concentration in organizational
size changes with levels of SA and PoA, across all the simulation runs. As expected,
the average Gini increases with SA. Also, as expected, the average Gini decreases
with PoA, even though its effect is apparent only for moderate levels of SA.
Figure 8 shows the average values of the polarization measure across different
levels of PoA and SA. Basically, it demonstrates that (1) when SA is very strong or
very weak, the emerging size distribution is not polarized, (2) when PoA becomes
stronger, the size distribution becomes more polarized. An alternative way of stating
these findings: for each level of PoA, the SA has an inverse U-shape effect on polar-
ization. When SA is weak, small organizations proliferate; and when SA is strong, a
few large organizations eventually dominate. But at intermediate levels of SA, polar-
ized or dual market structures emerge.
To cross-validate the p∗ measure as an indicator of market polarization and re-
source partitioning, we also conducted a different kind of test. Resource partitioning
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Fig. 8 Average polarization score by SA and PoA
theory asserts that in markets where partitioning took place, there will be a competi-
tive separation between organizations with wide niche width and small niche width.
To test whether high values of p∗ pick up this separation, we conducted the following
test. At the end of each simulation run (at 100 period), for all organization dyads (i.e.,
40∗39/2 = 7,800 dyads), we calculated whether the two organizations have an over-
lap in their niches (direct competition). Then, we run logistic regressions to estimate
how the niche widths of organizations affect whether they compete in different p∗
outcomes. We found (results not shown here) that in markets with high p∗, the level
of cross-competition between narrow- and wide-niche width organizations is much
lower than it is in low p∗ markets. This finding is in accordance with the prediction
of resource partitioning theory.
To assess precisely the effects of SA and PoA levels on concentration and polar-
ization across the runs, we estimated linear regressions. This is what Law and Kelton
(2000) call a “metamodel” of the simulation. It simplifies by using linear regression
but allows for the simultaneous inclusion of many factors. As Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate,
the effects of PoA and SA on concentration and polarization are non-monotonic, so
we also include the quadratic forms of PoA and SA values. Also, because both our
theory and Figs. 7 and 8 suggest dependence between the effects of PoA and SA, we
include their linear and quadratic interaction terms.
It is perhaps important to emphasize that the coefficient estimates of the regression
models force the effects of PoA and SA on concentration and polarization (already
shown in Figs. 7 and 8) to operate through the specified regression equation. Al-
though linear and quadratic regressions likely oversimplify the relationships shown
in Fig. 7 and 8, we find them helpful for understanding what is going on because as
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the number of parameters increase, graphs are not tractable any more. That is, we use
these functional forms as simplifications to summarize possibly complicated results
rather than as any precise specification of underlying causal relationships.
Table 1 shows the estimated linear regression coefficients for concentration (Gini)
and polarization (p∗) on the SA and PoA settings, respectively (the simulation setup
is the same that is described above). Basically, all the estimated effects are in line
with expectations for the model’s validity. Higher PoA depresses concentration, and
higher SA increases it. The interaction effect of PoA and SA is negative, indicating
that when SA is strong, the negative effect of PoA amplifies (i.e., becomes more
negative). This condition gives rise to the possibility of polarization.
The second column of Table 1 shows the coefficients on polarization. We also
find this regression instructive: while both SA and PoA exert negative main effects
on polarization, the interaction effect between PoA and SA drives the polarization
measure (keep in mind that the values of PoA range between 0 and 2, and the values
of SA range between 0 and 8). The strong positive interaction effect shows that the
emerging size distribution tends to become polarized as both PoA and SA strengthen.
The parameter estimates are in accordance with the results of Figs. 7 and 8.
To check the robustness of the above results, we conducted thorough sensitivity
analyses on the initial parameters, specifically varying the number of organizations,
the size of the resource space, and the initial size of the engagement budget (this is
where relying on regressions becomes necessary: it would be very cumbersome to
create a graph for each parameter combination). We reanalyzed the effect of PoA and
SA on concentration and polarization (see Table 1) under various initial conditions.
Table 1 Regression estimates of effects of SA and PoA on Gini and polarization
Gini Polarization
PoA (A) −0.0224*** −0.0086***
(0.0028) (0.0013)
PoA2 (A2) 0.0001 0.0065***
(0.001) (0.0005)
SA (Q) 0.1312*** −0.0021***
(0.0007) (0.0003)
SA2 (Q2) −0.0109*** −0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PoA × SA (A × Q) −0.0046*** 0.0056***
(0.0005) (0.0001)
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Table 2 Sensitivity analysis of varying initial conditions
Gini Polarization
PoA (A) −0.0164*** −0.0056***
(0.0009) (0.0005)
PoA2 (A2) 0.0028*** 0.0064***
(0.0004) (0.0002)
SA (Q) 0.1238*** 0.0027***
(0.0002) (0.0000)
SA2 (Q2) −0.0096*** −0.0008***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PoA × SA (A × Q) −0.0094*** 0.0078***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
PoA2 × SA2 (A2 × Q2) 0.0004*** −0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of organizations 0.0012*** −0.0007***
(0.0000) (0.000)
Initial engagement budget −0.0126*** 0.0043***
(0.0000) (0.0001)







Table 2 shows the estimated linear regression on Gini and p∗, such as in Table 1, but
now with including various levels of the number of organizations (varied between
20,25, . . . ,60); the number of resource positions (varied between 5,6, . . . ,15), and
the initial size of the engagement budget (0.5,1,1.5,2). The estimates show clearly
that although the initial conditions influence the concentration and the polarization of
the market, the main effects of PoA and SA on concentration and polarization do not
change appreciably.
6.2 Evolution of Gini and polarization
The above analysis shows how SA and PoA influence the equilibrium market struc-
ture. Now we investigate how concentration and polarization evolve over time in the
four PoA/SA setups shown in Fig. 5. The other parameters remain fixed, as above.
We compare the four cases: (1) no SA, no PoA; (2) no SA, strong PoA; (3) strong
SA, no PoA; and (4) strong SA, strong PoA. The first case, no SA-no PoA, describes
our baseline case, in which organizations’ sizes change more or less randomly, and
we only expect a slight increase of Gini and polarization over time (due to the Gibrat
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Fig. 9 Average Gini score over time for various SA/PoA settings
Fig. 10 Average polarization over time for various SA/PoA settings
growth process). The second case, no SA–strong PoA applies to populations where
focus constitutes an advantage. Here we expect concentration to remain low. The
third case, strong SA–no PoA is the classic scale advantage setup, where we expect
the large organizations to dominate eventually. Therefore, we expect the Gini-index
to increase over time, and the polarization measure to decrease over time. The fourth
case, strong SA–strong PoA, is the balanced setup where we expect dual market
structures to emerge. Figures 9 and 10, respectively, show the evolution of the average
Gini and polarization over time.
Figure 9 shows that concentration (Gini) increases over time in all setups but dra-
matically so when SA is strong. Clearly, SA operates as expected. Interestingly, PoA
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only has a discernible effect on the Gini index in cases where SA is strong (this is
consistent with our earlier findings on the equilibrium effects of SA and PoA).
Figure 10 reveals substantial differences in the temporal patterns of polarization
for the different cases. With no SA, polarization increases gradually. With strong SA,
however, a strong non-monotonic pattern appears: in the earlier periods polarization
increases sharply, after which it decreases slowly to an equilibrium level. In these
strong SA cases, PoA exerts a strong effect on the polarization measure: in cases
in which PoA is strong, polarization stabilizes at a relatively high level, indicating
dual market structures. Without PoA, however, polarization drops back relatively fast,
indicating a highly concentrated size distribution.
Why do the strong SA cases produce this non-monotonic pattern in the evolution
of the polarization measure? Our investigations into the specifics of simulated trajec-
tories suggest the following scenario. In the early phase of the process, organizations
are small and the system contains excess demand. That is, each organization can
freely grow without being constrained by competition. In conditions with no SA, the
organizations grow at more or less the same speed, resulting in a relatively slow and
gradual increases in concentration and polarization (given that in the initial condition
each organization is of the same size, any variance in size results in increase in the
concentration and polarization). Around the 10–12th period,5 however, organizations
develop enough capacity to satisfy all the demand and competition begins driving the
process through the differences in engagement. In the no SA cases, organizations have
the same level of engagement, and the process and the size distribution stabilizes. In
the strong SA cases, the size distribution gets less polarized after the initial periods,
but this decrease corresponds to two different underlying size distributions. In the
strong PoA case, a dual market structure emerges, with a few large organizations and
larger number of small organizations, yielding high polarization and relatively high
concentration. In the no PoA case, however, the market will be populated by a small
number of large organizations, thus generating the lower equilibrium polarization and
high concentration.
The evolution of niche widths and organizational sizes are also worth mentioning.
In our simulations, the aggregate size of simulated organizations increases monotoni-
cally over time: in the beginning of the simulations, organizations do not have enough
capacity to fulfill all the demand, and their aggregate size increases as organizations
increase their capacity, eventually fulfilling all the possible demand (which is a sta-
ble state in our simulations). The evolution of the average niche widths has a similar
monotone increasing trajectory (this is an automatic consequence of the model, which
does not permit niche contraction).
6.3 Resource distribution shape
How does the distribution of the resource space influence the organizational size dis-
tribution? In general, organizational ecology leads us to expect that the more con-
centrated the resource space is, the more concentrated the emerging size distribution
5Obviously, the exact timing depends on the other parameters of the model.
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Fig. 11 Illustrative different
values of ResDist
of organizations will be (Boone et al. 2002). Also, resource partitioning theory pos-
tulates that if we find the conditions of (1) strong PoA, (2) strong SA, and (3) a
concentrated resource distribution, then the emerging size distribution will be polar-
ized.6 A basic idea is that when large organizations venture into market positions
with scarce resources, they lose more from the PoA than they gain from increasing
SA. We have seen above that polarized market structures can emerge even if the re-
source space is uniformly distributed. In this section, we study how the effects of PoA
and SA change with increasingly concentrated resource distribution. We did so by re-
configuring the environmental resource distribution in the simulation. We introduce
a variable, ResDist, that determines to what extent the resource distribution diverges
from uniform. In our model, ResDist can be viewed as a slope in the ranking of po-
sitions. See Fig. 11 for an illustration (but recall that the visual ordering of positions
shown here does not matter). If ResDist is high, resources are concentrated and the
tastes are rather homogeneous; if ResDist is low, resources are spread more evenly
across positions and tastes are heterogeneous.
As in Tables 1 and 2, we estimated linear regressions to investigate how the con-
centration of the resource distribution affects the emerging polarization and concen-
tration of organizational sizes. Table 3 shows the regression estimates of equilibrium
polarization and concentration on the SA (Q), PoA (A) and ResDist settings for the
simulation. The initial parameter values are as before, and ResDist varies between 0
6Several other important assumptions are made in resource partitioning theory to generate this prediction,
namely, that (1) the dimensions of the resource space are ordered; and (2) the overall shape of the resource
distribution is unimodal.
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Table 3 Regression estimates of effects of concentration in resource distribution (ResDist) on bifurcation
Gini Polarization
PoA (A) −0.0266*** −0.0102***
(0.0006) (0.0002)
PoA2 (A2) 0.0003 0.0087***
(0.0002) (0.0004)
SA (Q) 0.1574*** −0.0081***
(0.0002) (0.0000)
SA2 (Q2) −0.0145*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PoA × SA (A × Q) −0.0039*** 0.0056***
(0.0003) (0.0000)




A × ResDist 0.0012*** −0.0006**
(0.0001) (0.0000)
Q × ResDist −0.0011*** −0.0004***
(0.000) (0.0000)






Note: Higher values of ResDist indicate more concentrated resource spaces
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
and 8. Beside the main effect of resource distribution (ResDist), we included inter-
actions with PoA and SA to explore how the effect of PoA and SA changes across
different resource distributions.
First, note that the main effects of SA and PoA from above hold across different
levels of resource space concentration. Second, note that the main effect of concentra-
tion in the resource space agrees with expectations: more concentrated resource space
leads to organizational size distributions that are both more concentrated and more
polarized. Third, the interaction variables between resource space concentration and
PoA and SA are interesting. For the Gini, the negative coefficient of the interaction
with SA shows that in concentrated resource spaces, SA is less important; the positive
coefficient of the interaction with PoA shows that the effect of PoA is weaker in con-
centrated resource spaces (this finding is not surprising either). For polarization: the
interaction between concentration of resource distribution and SA is negative, i.e., in
runs with concentrated resource space, stronger scale advantage leads to lower polar-
ization. This finding confirms the new scope condition for Resource Partitioning we
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Table 4 Regression estimates of effects of niche expansion on ln(Sizet+1/Sizet )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(Sizet+1/Sizet ) ln(Sizet+1/Sizet ) ln(Sizet+1/Sizet )
NW t,t+1 −0.044*** −0.128*** −0.211***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.040)
NW t −0.002** −0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)




NW t,t+1 × Sizet 0.016***
(0.004)
NW t,t+1 × NW t × Sizet −0.002***
(0.000)
Constant −0.016*** −0.013*** −0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 39,600 39,600 39,600
R2 0.0002 0.0006 (0.003)
Note: Observations of size = 0 are excluded
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
identified before: too high SA leads to too high concentration, so polarization cannot
take place.
6.4 Organizational strategy
Here we turn our focus to the organizational level, and ask what might be good strate-
gies for organizations under various environmental conditions. More specifically, we
ask: When is it beneficial for an organization to increase its niche width? To explore
this question, we assign different niche expansion parameters to the organizations in
each setup, and observe how the organizations’ sizes change when entering a new
position.
In the simulations we show below, we assumed a uniform resource distribution,
with PoA parameter A = 2 and SA parameter Q = 3.5. While in the previous analy-
ses we investigated macro level properties of the system (concentration and polar-
ization), here we expect that the two advantaged strategies (being focused or being
large) will emerge from the organizational level estimates as well.
To investigate the success of various strategies, we rely on linear regression. We
use linear regressions, because regressions allow us to investigate the effect of multi-
ple variables (while graphs can only show the relationship between two or three vari-
ables at a given time). Table 4 contains three regression estimates on the size changes
after entering a new position. Consistent with growth models typically estimated
from empirical data, the dependent variable is ln(Sizet+1/Sizet ). In the regression,
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each organization-time period comprises an observation. After excluding organiza-
tions with zero size, the simulation data yield 39,600 observations. The regression
compares size change when the organization enters a new position (NW t,t+1 = 1)
with outcomes when (under similar conditions) it does not enter a new position
(NW t,t+1 = 0). We also include control variables for the organization’s niche width
(NW t ) at t (Model 2), and the size of the organization at t (Model 3).
The results are in line with our expectations: entering a new position leads to a
decrease in size. This reflects the force of the PoA. The interaction coefficient with
previous niche width is also positive, however, indicating that entering new positions
is beneficial for already-existing generalist organizations (niche width of six or more).
Even stronger is the interaction coefficient with size: this shows that it is better for
organizations already of a relatively large (size of 4 or more in this setup) to increase
niche width.
The above analysis shows that the two stable states for organizations in either a
strong SA or a strong PoA environment is to be, respectively, small and focused, or
large and generalist. It also provides some insight into why generalists exist at all:
if an organization occupies one position and it is of small size, it is better off in the
short term not to enter new positions. This situation, the above analysis suggests, can
only be overcome if the organization can grow large enough in its original position.
Because the dependent variable is non-linear, to ensure that we correctly inter-
preted the interaction variables (Hoetker 2007), we plotted the predicted effects of
the main variables and their interactions. The plots (not shown here), confirm the
effects of the interactions described above.
7 Ordered positions in resource space
So far we have considered only unordered resource positions. In this section, we
introduce a distance measure to the social space, because in various settings the re-
source space is ordered along meaningful social dimensions such as age, education,
or geographical location. Our question here is the following: Does the ordering of
positions or categories change the major findings?
We incorporate ordering in the following way. We array the positions linearly and
assume unit distance. So, the distance between two categories equals the difference
between their positions. For example, the distance between categories 5 and 7 is 2,
and we call two positions or categories neighboring if their distance is 1.
What processes does category ordering change? With ordered categories, the PoA
process changes. According to the PoA, category crossing is detrimental because
membership in different categories confuses members of the audience, causing them
to question a spanner’s identities (Hsu 2006). Therefore, we expect that the less sim-
ilar the straddled categories are, the higher the punishment will be. To build in this
operationalization of PoA, we change the discount factor audience members at each
resource position apply to the organizations’ local engagements. More specifically,
in each period t each organization a at each resource position x,
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(compare this with the unordered operationalization of PoA in Sect. 3).
We first investigate how SA and PoA affect polarization and concentration in or-
dered categories. We reran the analysis presented in Table 1 with ordered categories.
The results are quite similar to that of ordered categories: the signs and direction of
the main variables are the same as for unordered categories, so we do not show them
here. In short, the main result still holds: polarization can only be high if both PoA
and SA are present, and they are not too strong.
Now we turn to analyze the micro level result: how does the category ordering
affect optimal organizational action? For unordered categories, we find that in high
PoA–high SA settings the main effect of niche expansion on size is negative, but
it is positive for organizations that are already large. Here, in settings with ordered
categories, we expect the same relationship to hold, but we also expect that wide niche
is especially detrimental if there are gaps in it, i.e., in cases when organizations enter
distant new niches, those that do not neighbor with positions they already occupy.
To explore these questions, we observe how the organizations’ sizes change when
entering a new position. In the simulations we show below, we assumed a uniform
resource distribution, with PoA parameter A = 2 and SA parameter Q = 3.5.
Table 5 shows three regression estimates on the size changes after entering a
new position. In the regressions, each organization-time period comprises an ob-
servation. Consistent with growth models typically estimated from empirical data,
the dependent variable is ln(Sizet+1/Sizet ). After excluding organizations with zero
size, the simulation data yield 118,000 observations. The regression compares size
changes when the organization enters a new position that connects to already oc-
cupied positions (NW t,t+1(entering neighboring position) = 1), when the orga-
nization enters a new position that does not connect to already occupied positions
(NW t,t+1(entering disconnected position) = 1), with outcomes when (under simi-
lar conditions) it does not enter a new position (NW t,t+1 = 0). Similarly to Table 4,
we include controls for the size and niche width of the organization at time t .
The findings of Table 5 confirm our expectations: entering new positions is detri-
mental to growth. Moreover, growth is dampened more strongly if the new position
does not connect to a position that is already occupied by the organization.
As above, because the dependent variable is non-linear, to ensure that we correctly
interpreted the interaction variables (Hoetker 2007), we plotted the predicted effects
of the main variables and their interactions. The plots (not shown here), confirm the
effects of the interactions described above.
8 Discussion
We set out here to analyze the trade-off between the two major components of macro
organizational behavior’s niche theories, the Principle of Allocation (PoA) and Scale
Advantage (SA). Adapting recent notions of audiences, resources, and the identity of
organizations (Hannan et al. 2007), we built a computational model to analyze the
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Table 5 Ordered categories: regression estimates of effects of niche expansion on ln(Sizet+1/Sizet )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(Sizet+1/Sizet ) ln(Sizet+1Sizet ) ln(Sizet+1Sizet )
NW t,t+1(entering neighboring positions) −0.041*** −0.145*** −0.150***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.025)
NW t,t+1(entering disconnected positions) −0.082*** −0.202*** −0.172***
(0.008) (0.024) (0.024)
NW t −0.004*** −0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
NW t,t+1(entering neighboring positions) 0.026*** 0.021***
×NW t (0.005) (0.006)
NW t,t+1(entering disconnected positions) 0.049*** 0.009
×NW t (0.009) (0.011)
Sizet 0.002***
(0.000)
NW t,t+1(entering neighboring positions) 0.002
×Sizet (0.001)
NW t,t+1(entering disconnected positions) −0.011***
×Sizet (0.002)
Constant −0.011*** −0.005** −0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 118,800 118,800 118,800
R2 0.0008 0.0017 0.0040
Note: Observations of size = 0 are excluded
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
evolution of organizational populations under various environmental setups. In short,
our model assumes that organizations face an audience. The members of the audience
can be described by a multidimensional social space, and the positions of audience
members in the space determine their tastes, resulting in a given distribution of de-
mand across resource positions. According to the PoA, each organization possesses
a given budget for engaging the audience, and distributes this engagement budget
across the positions. SA is built into the model by relaxing the constant engagement
assumption of PoA for larger organizations. Also, to model organizational evolution,
we incorporated organizational capacity and niche expansion into our framework.
We first validated the model by showing that it reproduces three basic expectations
for the “corner” solutions: (1) the dominance of large organizations in the strong SA
setting, (2) the proliferation of narrow-niche and small organizations in the strong
PoA setting, and (3) a dual market structure (based on either niche or size) when both
SA and PoA are present.
The findings also correspond to our original expectation about the trade-off be-
tween PoA and SA: simulations show that in environments with strong PoA and SA,
surviving organizations tend to be either large or focused (narrow-niche) to survive.
So, on the population level, the combination of PoA and SA results in a dual mar-
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ket structure, as proposed by Carroll’s (1985) theory of resource partitioning. It is
noteworthy that we were able to do this here without incorporating processes of or-
ganizational entry and exit, empirical stalwarts of the resource partitioning research
program. The model has thus extended the known implications of the theory by push-
ing it into a new domain.
The modeling results reveal an important scope condition for resource partition-
ing: the scale advantage cannot be too strong, because when SA is too strong it can
overpower PoA and lead to a concentrated size distribution with low polarization. In
other words, for any given level of PoA, SA has a non-monotonic effect, (1) if SA
is very low or non-existent, the market will be fragmented, (2) if SA is strong but
not too strong, polarization will take place (this is the resource partitioning situation),
and (3) if SA is too strong, SA will overpower PoA and concentration will be high
and polarization will be low. This scope condition has not been explicitly identified
before in the literature, although some may say it is implicit in the typical distinction
of generalists and specialists where only generalists are seen as evolving with scale
advantages.
The above trade-off, however, is mediated by the resource distribution. Our find-
ings regarding the main effect of concentration in the resource space agrees with
expectations: more concentrated resource space leads to organizational size distribu-
tions that are both more concentrated and more polarized. This finding confirms the
original assumption of resource partitioning theory that bifurcation takes place in a
central-periphery resource distribution, but it shows that bifurcation can also happen
in markets with less concentrated resource distributions (although the polarization
here is weaker).
For organizational action, we aimed to identify circumstances under which spe-
cialists or generalist are favored, and we searched for cases where it is beneficial to
increase niche width. Analyzing organizational action reinforced the population level
results: under strong PoA and strong SA conditions, if an organization is small and
focused, it is better off staying small and focused; on the other hand, if an organiza-
tion is already relatively large or generalist, it is better off entering new positions.
Finally, we investigated whether the findings hold in resource spaces in which
the resource positions are ordered. In order to do this, we modified our basic model
so that it accommodates ordering in the resource space. Specifically, we built this
ordering into PoA processes. Relying on previous literature, we asserted that the less
similar the straddled categories are, the higher the punishment will be. We found that
ordered categories and the modified PoA process does not change substantially the
major relationships between SA and PoA, yielding the previously seen polarization
and concentration of the organizational size and niche width distribution. We found,
however, that category ordering does have important consequences for organizational
action: when expanding, organizations are better off entering neighboring positions
than entering disconnected positions.
8.1 Future research directions
In the computational model developed here, we relied on the Hannan et al. (2007)
model of audiences, identity and competition; we tried to build a computational
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model that follows—and fleshes out in one particular way—the theory outlined in
that book. The resulting model, however, might be modified profitably in many di-
rections. In our view, a promising venture would aim to simplify the model, and
by implementing other assumptions to try to come up with a model setup that can
be solved analytically. This would provide a better grasp on the robustness of the
findings—as simulations can never exhaust all possible parameter values.
Another avenue for further research would be in the opposite direction, namely, to
incorporate more “realistic” assumptions. These efforts might start with relaxing cer-
tain simplifying assumptions used here. These might include: (1) allowing intrinsic
appeal to vary by environmental position; (2) letting unused capacity generate some
kind of additional competitive process; and (3) expanding dramatically the number
of environmental positions and organizational actors.
Looking towards other issues not really considered here, we see interesting possi-
bilities for extending the set of possible strategies for organizations in the model. In
the model described above, organizations expand their engagement to new resource
positions randomly if they grow in size, and distribute the growth in their engagement
to this new resource position. This rule of niche expansion and engagement alloca-
tion, admittedly, is quite simple. Organizational managers, of course, typically intend
to be strategic in entering and exiting resource positions, and follow more subtle rules
for allocating engagement budgets. At least some of these could be simulated. Also,
when investigating and comparing the efficiency of various strategies, one could al-
low for time-dependent strategies. For example, in some circumstances, it might be
reasonable for organizations to focus their engagement for a while, and then expand.
In other cases, early expansion might be more beneficial. Indeed, in the Hannan et al.
(2007) story, the returns to engagement at new positions are delayed for some time.
Another extension to the model would be to connect the size of a resource position
to the total amount of the engagement budget spent in the position. As the theory of
density dependence (Hannan 1986) holds, a population’s fundamental niche increases
with the number of organizations in the population. As a parallel, it might make sense
to argue that the legitimation and total demand in a position increase as organizations
spend more resources and engage more at that position.
A different avenue for further research would be to incorporate entry and exit
processes into the model. To keep the model tractable in this initial phase, we have
not incorporated explicit entry and exit processes, but rather we kept the pool of
organizations within each simulation run constant. Although resource partitioning
can be studied by following a fixed set of organizations, much empirical work on the
process builds on entry and exit processes. Thus, it would be interesting to see what
additional assumptions about entry and exit would support the findings reported here.
Finally, one could compare the behavior of the model with relevant empirical data.
Although finding data and comparing multiple populations with different levels of
PoA and SA is a daunting task, one could try to work around these problems. For
example, one could study populations that underwent external environmental shocks,
and observe how the size distribution and organizational strategies change as a result
of such shocks. As an example, consider a population that undergoes rapid techno-
logical progress: scale efficiencies often become stronger, affecting the size distrib-
ution of firms. If the change was externally generated (not a result of competition),
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one could test the size distribution before and after the change. Another possible
test, following a similar line of argument, would be to compare the size distribution
of organizational population that underwent legal-regulatory change such as the US
banking sector. As always, we suspect that it is a mistake to underestimate the imag-
ination and ingenuity of empirical researchers, and so we look forward to learning
about even better research designs on these important issues.
Appendix: Description of the polarization measure
While there are a number of well-known measures of the concentration in the organi-
zational size distributions (e.g., Gini, Herfindahl), there exists no established measure
of the polarization of the size distribution. Here we use a polarization measure, Wolf-
son’s p∗ (Wolfson 1994), used in the income distribution literature. To our knowl-
edge, this measure has not been used in the organizational literature, we briefly intro-
duce it here.
After discussing why concentration measures and earlier measures of polarization
are unable to grasp the ‘disappearing middle,’ Wolfson notes the duality between
polarization and inequality. He introduces a polarization measure based on the Lorenz
curve: by measuring the area between the Lorenz-curve and the tangent line of the
Lorenz-curve. Formally, p∗ = (T − Gini/2)/mtan, where mtan = “median tangent”,
i.e., the slope of the tangent to the Lorenz curve at the 50th percentile; and T equals
the area of the trapezoid defined by the 45-degree line and the median tangent.
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